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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
WEENIG BROTHERS, INC., a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

No. 7992

M. NEPHI MANNING.
Defendant and Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was filed by the plaintiff, W eenig Brothers,
Inc., hereinafter referred to as the nCorporation," against
the defendant, M. Nephi Manning, for the recovery of damages arising from a collision occuring between the Corporation's truck and Manning's automobile.
On the early morning of November 27, 1950, Ronald Z.
W eenig, an employee of the Corporation, reported for work
and at about 7:00 o'clock A.M., left the Corporation's place
of business in 0 gden, Utah, on a doughnut delivery route·
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(Tr. 3). He made a few deliveries around Ogden, (Tr. 3) and
then proceeded North on Wall Avenue (Tr. 4). He was driving the Corporation's 1948 Chevrolet station wagon (Tr. 4).
Wall Avenue is a two-larie roadway, one lane for northbound
ttaffic and one lane provided .for southbound traffic. It is an
improved hard-surfaced roadway and runs generally in a
north-south direction (Tr. 4 and 5), the same being 21 feet
in width and with shoulders of about 7 feet ad joining the
concrete (Tr. 5 and 43). There is a barrow pit paralleling the
east.erly side of the highway, about 2 feet in depth (Tr. 5 and
45-Defendant' s Exhibit 1).
On this morning, there was an intermittent fog spread over
portions. of 0 gden and as W eenig drove north on Wall Street,
he observed this atmospheric condition (Tr. 4, 14, 15 and 44).
The roadway was ~ry (Tr. 11, 74 and so-Defendant's Exhibit 1) , and W eenig was familiar with the road, having
driven it many times for the year and one-half previous (Tr.
4, 12 and 13) . As he reached the 2nd Street intersection, the
. fog became quite thick and W eenig turned the lights on in
plaintiff Corporation's truck. The speed limit for this area on
Wall Avenue is 40 miles .per hour (Tr. 6). Weenig continu·
ed north after passing 2nd Street, driving in his lane for
northbound traffic. At this point the fog became more dense
and visibility was reduced ( T r. 6, 14) . A short time there·
after, Weenig suddenly saw two parallel sets of lights ahead
of him, one set indicating a vehicle was approaching on his
side of the highway (Tr. 16, 21, 22). The vehicle on Weenig's
side of the highway was owned and being driven by M. Nephi
Manning, defendant and appellee herein.

4
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According to the testimony of Weenig and the investigating officer, Weenig was traveling at approximately 30
miles per hour when he suddenly saw Manning's _vehicle
coming directly toward him from out . of the fog (Tr .. 6,
16, 42). There is a conflict in the evidence regarding Weenig's
speed at that time as Manning claims it was at a Hfrightening
speed," (Tr. 7?,) while witness Carter, an expert called by
the defense, testified it could have been 42 miles per hour
or greater (Tr. 121). At the instant Weenig observed Manning's vehicle approaching, it was on his side of the highway,
parallel with another automobile also proceeding so~th, and
only about fifty feet away (Tr. 6, 21, 22). Defendant Manning estimated the distance between his automobile and the
Weenig truck to have been between seventy-five and one hun . .
dred feet (Tr. 70 and 71), that he had turned out to pass this
other southbound vehicle, and that he was traveling about
25 to 30 miles per hour .(Tr. 42, 84). Apparently both Weenig
and Manning attempted to avoid the impending c<;>llision by
turning their respective vehicles to the right (Tr. 6 and 70).
However, the vehicles were together before the drivers had
time to do any more than merely sense the danger and · react,
.. . and the .left front of the Manning coupe collided with the left
side of the W eenig truck as it veered to. the northeast ( T r.
6 and 71-Defendant' s Exhibit 1) . The left front wheel of
Manning's automobile was 3 feet. to the east of the center
of the roadway at th_e time of the impact, by his own testi-.
mony (Tr. 75), and he further testified that his vehicle was
completely over on Weenig's one-half of the highway when
he first observed its headlights ·some seventy-five to one hundred feet ahead (Tr. 81 and 82).
.
5
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After the impact, the Weenig truck left the easterly edge
of the roadway and rolled over in the barrow pit, coming to a
stop with its wheels in the air and resting on its top (Tr.
Defendant's Exhibit 1) . The place where it came to a stop was
on the east side of the highway, some 115 feet northeast of
the point of impact (Tr. 43 and 75). The Manning automobile
skidded south some 40 feet from th~ point of the impact and
stopped, facing south, still on the concrete portion of the
highway (Tr. 72 and 73).
As a result of this collision, the Weenig truck sustained
extensive damage (Plaintiff's Exhibit A and Defendant's Exhibit 1) , requiring the Corporation to dispose of the truck,
receiving $300.00 for its salvage value (Tr. 2 and 65-Plaintiff' s Exhibit B) . The reasonable value of the truck at the
time of the accident was $1370.00, making a net loss to
the Corporation of $1070.00 (Tr. 2 and 65). The Corporation
incurred further damage in the sum of $17.50, for wrecker
and storage charges (Tr. 2-Plaintiff's Exhibit C).
At the conclusion of the trial, the court took the case
under advisement (Tr. 126) and on November 10, 1952, rendered judgment in favor of defendant and against the plaintiff
corporation, no cause for action, on the grounds that plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence (R. 020). Plaintiff
Corporation's counsel then filed and thereafter argued a motion
to set aside the decision for defendant and to enter judgment
for the plaintiff Corporation, or in the alternative for a new
trial (R. 015), which motion was ultimately denied by the
trial court (R. 016). The court thereafter signed and filed its
findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment
6
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in accordance therewith on February 26, 1953 (R. 009 through
012).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
The plaintiff Corporation filed this appeal, and has designated and included the entire record and all of th~ proceedings
and evidence in the action, and in its appeal relies upon the
following points:
I. The trial court erred in making and entering Finding of
Fact No. 5 to the effect that the plaintiff corporation's truck
automobile was of the reasonable value of $1,020.00 .at the
time of the accident for the reason that it was stipulated by
counsel for the defendant at trial that said truck's reasonable
value was $1,3 70.00 and that the salvage value thereof was
$300.00, making a~ net loss to the plaintiff of $1,070.00 ·for the
truck as a result of the accident with defendant.
II. The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff corporation's employee was driving its truck at a speed of. between 46
and 53 miles per hour at the. time -of the accident with defendant on the ground and for the reason that said finding
is wholly unsupported by the evidence.
III. The trial court erred in finding that" the damages sustained to plaintiff corporation's truck were not the result of
any carelessness or negligence on the part of the defendant
for the reason that such a finding is unsupported by the evidence and contrary to law.
7
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IV. The trial court erred in finding .that the speed of
plai~tiff co~poration' s truck was negligence on the part of its
driver which contributed to the damages sustained by plaintiff
on the grol.}.nd and for the reason that such a finding is unsupported by the evidence and contrary to· law.
V. That there is no evidence to support the Conclusions
of Law, and the Judgment of no caues of action is contrary to
law.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT NO. 5 TO THE EFFECT
THAT· THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S TRUCK
AUTOMOBILE WAS OF THE REASONABLE VALUE OF
$1,020.00 AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT FOR THE
REASON THAT IT WAS STIPULATED BY COUNSEL
FOR THE DEFENDANT AT TRIAL THAT SAID TRUCK'S
REASONABLE VALUE WAS $1,370.00 AND THAT THE
SALVAGE VALUE THEREOF. WAS $300.00 MAKING A
NET LOSS TO THE PLAINTIFF OF $1,070.00 AS A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT WITH DEFENDANT.
At the trial of this case, counsel for defendant, M. Nephi
Manning, stipulated in the record that the reasonable value
of the plaintiff corporation's truck at the time of the collision
with the defendant was $1,370.00, and that the sum of $300.00
was received by the plaintiff as salvage, making a total or net
8
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loss of $1,070.00 (Tr. 2 and 65). This was an unequivocal
stipulation on the part of defendant's counsel, with no evidence contrary thereto in the record. We believe this error in
figures was an oversight on the part of defendant's counsel
in his preparation of the findings of fact and will be confessed

in his responding brief.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S EMPLOYEE WAS DRIVING ITS TRUCK AT A SPEED OF BETWEEN 46 AND 53!
MILES PER HOUR AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT
WITH DEFENDANT ON THE GROUND AND FOR THE
REASON THAT SAID FINDING IS.WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The only evidence before the court touching upon the
speed of plaintiff's truck in excess of 30 miles per hour was
that the defendant said it was coming at eta frightening speed,"
(Tr. 73) and that of expert witness Carter who stated that
it could have been 42 miles per hour or greater (Tr. 121).
It will be readily appreciated that the defendant's testimony
would be of little value as he was not in a position to make
any worthwhile observatio-n of the speed of a vehicle approaching directly in front of him and when he himself was traveling
approximately the same speed. His statement would be selfserving at best because he had created the perilous situation
and would be attempting to justify his position by placing
the blame for the impending collision upon· the plaintiff's

9
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driver and explain away his own culpability. We accordingly
turn to expert witness Carter's testimony for a review of
exactly what he said concerning the speed of plaintiff's truck
based upon the distance it traveled after the impact coupled
with the fact that it turned over. His testimony is covered in
the record beginning with page 107. We might say here that
we do not wish to belabor the court with a review of this evidence as we fail to see wherein the speed of plaintiff's truck
in any way contributed to this accident, but we do wish to
clarify the· situation so that this court will not be misled into
believing that the truck was traveling anywhere near as fast
as is indicated in the trial court's findings. Much of this witness's testimony g0es to laying a foundation for his qualifications and then at page 117 of the record, the witness concludes
that rrapparently from what I deduct it rolled one and a half."
The witness then said in r~sponse to the trial court's question
concerning the speed for one and a half rolls of the truck
(Tr. 117):.

Q. {(Now, one and a half rolls?
A. One and a half rolls would be thirty and six-tentbs

miles per hour . . .

JJ

Witness Carter did not know at what place, after the point of
impact, that the truck began to roll as he stated that he didn't
know where it started to roll (Tr. 118). On this same page of
the transcript, defendant's counsel asked concerning the speed
after a forty-foot skid but there was no evidence in the record
to show that plaintiff's truck skidded forty feet prior to its
rolling over. In fact all of the evidence is to the effect that
after the impact with defendant's vehicle, the truck veered to
10
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the northeast and left the highway some forty feet north of the
point of impact (Tr. 102) and it likely traveled· some distance on the shoulder of the highway before it even began
rolling. The defendant and his witness Ross H. Johnson took
measurements by tape from the point of impact on the highway
to the place where the truck came to rest on its ·top, and they
both testified the distance was 113 feet (Tr. 43, 55, 75 and
103). The investigating· officer arrived· at the scene of the collision immediate!y after the accident occurred and in testifying
about the visible markings on the roadway made by the plaintiff's truck, said (Tr. 61):
By Mr. Bayle: ((You said you saw forty feet here, the
marks of the tires of Weenig' s car or vehicle, what
kind of marks were they ?

A. From the point of the accident?

Q. Yes.
A. I don't recall saying I saw it.

Q. · Did you see any from the point of the accident to
the shoulder of the highway?

A. The shoulder of the highway is ~here I noticed the
first impression of a tire that would attach to .the
W eenig car."
This witness also testified that the W eenig vehicle made tire
marks on the highway after the point of impact but denied
they were skid marks as defense counsel's questions attempted
to have shown (Tr. 55-56). These tire marks apparently merely
indicated the direction of travel of the pfaintiff' s truck to the
easte~ly edge of the highway. The only conclusion to be drawn
is that Witness Carter was apparently using the 40 feet of skid
l l
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marks layed down by defendant's automobile after the impact,
rather than any skid marks by ·the plaintiff's truck, of which
there were none. Thus the. calculations made by Witness Carter
that plaintiff's truck could have been g?ing between 42 and
54% miles per hour were all deduced from conjecture, and
assumed that plaintiff's truck left 40 feet of skid marks and
then immediately began to roll (Tr. 118 and 119-Blackboard
Chart and Diagram at R. 018 and 019). Thus his conclusions are
speculative and assumed upon a given set of facts whi~h were
not in evidence at the time of his testimony.
We respectfully urge that this court reject any conclusions
drawn by Witness Carter concerning plaintiff truck's speed
at the time of the collision as being unsupported by the evidence
and conjectural in nature.
POINTS III and IV
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED TO PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S TRUCK WERE NOT THE RESULT OF ANY
CARELESSNESS OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF
THE DEFENDANT FOR THE REASON THAT SUCH A
FINDING IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
CONTRARY TO LAW.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE SPEED OF PLAINTIFF CORPORA~fiON'S TRUCK
12
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WAS NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF. ITS DRIVER
WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY PLAINTIFF ON THE GROUND AND FOR THE
REASON THAT SUCH A FINDING IS UNSUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW.
It is the contention of the plaintiff corporation that the
trial court erred in making and entering findings of fact to
the effect that the acts of the defendant in no measure caused
the accident and resulting damages · to plaintiff's truck, and
that the collision was the responsibility of plaintiff's driver.
These findings are wholly contrary to the decision of the trial
court rendered after taking the case under advisement, and
as indicated .by the order of the court by minute entry" on
November 10, 1952 (R. 020.) wherein the court found the
issue in favor of the defendant, no cause for action, on the
grounds that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
We do not know why the findings of fact eventually signed
by the trial _court were not in accord with the previous decision
as the written findings were silent as to defendant's negligence,
and made no mention of a finding of contributory negligence on
the part of plaintiff's driver.
We believe the essential question to be disposed of on this
appeal is whether or not from the facts at hand the defendant
was negligent and if so, was the plaintiff's driver contributorily
negligent.
The evidence shows, without dispute or contradiction,
that at the time of the collision occurring between defendant's
automobile and the plaintiff corporation's truck, the defend-

13
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ant was traveling on the wrong or improper side of the highway for his direction of travel. We need only consider the defendant's own testimony in this respect to establish that he
turned his automobile to the improper side of the highway in
an attempt to pass another vehicle, and at the time he could
only see between 75 and 100 feet ahead (Tr. 70 and 71). The
court's attention is .respectfully invited to the testimony on
cross examination of the defendant, wherein the question ·of
defendant's position on the highway is clearly established
(Tr. 81 ).:
By Mr. Bayle: ccso you had been on Weenig's side
of the highway and were swinging back to get out of
the way, were you not?
A. That is correct.

Q. How long had you been over on that side of his
highway?·
A. Only a matter of a second. Just got out there and was
dropping back.

Q. You said you saw his headlights seventy-five to
one hundred feet· away, didn't you?
A. Well, I suppose, that is about right.
Q. And what did you do as soon as you saw his headlights?
A. I started to turn back.

Q. Where was your car at that time?
A. Oh, possibly another three or four feet farther
east than it was at the point of impact.

Q. So that your car was completely over on the east·
erly side of the highway when you first saw the
headlights of the Weenig truck, is that right?
14
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A. I wouldn't say (completely'.
Q. Well, you said it was about three feet plus another
four, that is seven feet?

A. Well, the car is six feet wide, it could have been
six feet.
Q. So it could have been six feet over on his side of
the road?

A. That is right."
The investigating officer and all other witnesses who testified
concerning .the place of impact, determined that it occurred
3 feet to the east of the center of the highway. This point
marked the left wheel of the defendant's automobile, so inasmuch as the left fender of his vehicle extended beyond the
wheel, his automobile was at least 4 feet into the plaintiff
truck's lane of traffic when the collision occurred~ The law
imposes a duty on motorists to drive on the right side of highways. Title 41~6-53, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as
follows:
((Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall
be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except ·
as follows:
·
.

( 1) When overtaking and passing another vehicle
proceeding in the same direction under the rules
governing such movement."
Title 41-6-57 of the same Utah Code places a limitation upon
drivers who undertake to pass vehicles on a two-lane roadway,
providing as follows:
nNo vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the
center of the roadway in overtaking and passing an15
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other vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless
such left side is clearly visible and is free of oncon1ing
traffic for a sufficient. distance ahead to permit such
overtaking and passing to be completely made without
interfering with the safe operation of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction or any vehicle
. overtaken. In every event the overtaking vehicle must
return to the right-hand side of the roadway before
coming within 100 feet of any vehicle approaching
from the opposite direction."
It will ·be observed that the last sentence of this latter statute
places an absolute duty upon the driver of the ·overtaking
vehicle to return to his side of the highway before coming
within 100 feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite
direction. In the instant ~ase, defendant Manning didn't give
the driver of the corporation's truck anywhere near 100 feet as
the defendant testified at the trial that he could only see from
. 75 to 100 feet when he attempted to pass the vehicle proceeding ahead of him (Tr. 70, 71 and 81). As was said in
the case of Maragakis vs. United States, 172 F. 2d 393:
(tThe rule whether .statutory or decisional, which
requires driver of vehicle overtaking another proceeding in same direction to pass to the left at a safe distance, imposes a high degree of care commensurate with
the circumstances involved. The driver attempts to
pass at his peril, and the situation facing him must be
such as to reasonably assure an ordinary prudent drivet
that the passing can be accomplished U'ith safety to
all occupants of the road."
We believe this principle applies with even greater degree to
the oncoming motorist who is traveling on his own side of
the highway and is suddenly faced with the peril of meetinR

16
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a driver who has thrown caution to the winds and is bent upon
passing regardless of the situation. As this court has said in
the case of Staton vs. Western Macaroni Manufacturing Company, 52 Utah 426, 174 P. 821:
(<The strongest kind of presumption of negligence
prevails against party driving on wrong side of road.''
In the light of the facts of our instant case wherein defendant
Manning clearly admits that he turned onto the improper
side of the highway when he· could only see ahead between
75 and 100 feet, and in view of the foregoing principles, one
can come to no other conclusion than to say that the trial
court erred in its finding in failing to ad judge the defendant
guilty of the grossest kind of negligence. Turrietta vs. Wyche,
New Mexico, 54 N. M. 5, 212 P. 2d 1041.
We pass now to the question of whether or not plaintiff
corporation's driver, W eenig, was guilty of negligent conduct
which in any way contributed to the cause of the accident. At
the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant's counsel made a
motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint on the ground that
plaintiff had shown no right to relief because of Title 57-7-113,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which is presently designated
in the 1953 Code revision as Title 41-6-46 (Tr. 66 and 77).
The court overruled defendant's motion, and rightly so. The
aforementioned statute requires that a motorist shall not drive
a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable
and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the
actual and potential hazards then ·existing; that in every event
the speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid
17
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colliding with any person, vehicle or other conveyance on or
entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements
and the duty of all persons to use due care. This statute is
applicable only to objects, persons or vehicles lawfully on
the highway, either stationary or proceeding in the same direction as the motorist charged with such duty. It has no application to the situation of drivers approaching one another from
opposite directions. As· was said in the case of Snook vs. Long
(Iowa-1950) 241 Iowa 665, 42 NW 2d 76, 21 ALR 2d 1,
at page 5:
ctln the instant case, appellee was in his rightful
. place on the highway. He was entitled to assume that
anyone approaching him from the opposite direction
would observe the law which prohibits one from passing another car on the left unless it can be done without
interference with cars approaching from the opposite
direction. Appellant's driver clearly violated this law
and created a situation which would not reasonably be
anticipated by Appellee. As we said in Coon vs. Rieke,
232 Iowa 859, 6. N. W. 2d 309, this statute is a speed
sta.tute and where a driver of a motor vehicle, in his
proper place on the highway, meets an oncoming car
which does not give way to the right, there is no clear
distance ahead in which to determine the proper speed
at which he should drive."
We believe that the duty of drivers approaching from opposite
directions is not to stop but to comply with the law and yield
one-half of the traveled way. To permit defendant Manning
herein to escape liability for his culpable negligence by com·
plaining of the speed of defendant corporation's truck which
was proceeding on its own right and proper side of the high·
'vay would be manifestly unjust. It would establish a rule of
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law which would invite slaughter and mayhem upon our highways and give the driver proceeding upon the wrong side of
the roadway an opportunity to avoid responsibility for his
negligence in· sudden!y turning into the path of an oncoming
vehicle. We do not believe the law or this court would approve of a tendency to develop such a principle. The law requires that drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to the right and that where there
is width for not more than one line of traffic in each direction,
each driver shall give to the other at least one-half of the
main traveled portion of the roadway, Title 41-6-54, Utah Code
Annotated, 195~. It is recognized that one may drive upon
any part of the highway when it does not violate the law or
interfere with its use by others. But as this court said in the
case of Richards vs. Palace Laundry Company, 55 Utah 409,
186 Pac. 439:
ttWhile in case the street or highway is not used by
others one may drive on. any part thereof, yet, when a
motorist or bicyclist passes from right to left of the
center of the street, he loses some of his rights, and
may not be heard to complain ·of the conduct of those
who are on the proper side of the street to the same
extent as though he also were on the proper side."

In the instant case, ·defendant Manning was on the wrong side
of the highway; however, he contends that while that may
have been so, the defendant's driver was traveling too fast for
the foggy conditions then prevailing. Speed only becomes important when it is a contributing factor to the proximate cause
of the accident. Defendant Manning create~ a sudden and
perilous emergency by turning his vehicle to the improper side
19
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of the highway in violation of law and when he could see less
than 100 feet ahead (Tr. 122)·. Assuming both vehicles \\'ere
traveling approximately 30 miles. an hour, each would travel about 45 feet per· second (Tr. 124 and 125). The reaction time of each driver would be % of one second (Tr.
. 125). Giving defendant ·Manning the benefit of the doubt
by saying he saw the plaintiff's truck when it was 90 feet dis. tant from him, and applying the reaction time of each driver,
it would mean that the two vehicles would have collided before
either driver could do more than merely recognize the danger,
start to apply the brakes, and begin to turn to the right to
avoid the accident. At the speed of each vehicle traveling 30
miles per hour, and approaching each· other head on, the
collisi.on would occur within one ( 1) second, as each vehicle
woul~ tr~vel 45 feet, or one-half of the 90-foot distance,
within that short period of time. If either vehicle were traveling
faster than this speed of 30 miles per hour, the time would
be proportionately lessened as the speed increased.
How could it then be said that the speed of plaintiff's
driver, Weenig, contributed to this accident or had any bearing upon the collision. He was faced with a sudden and perilous
situation and he reacted as any reasonably prud~nt person
would have done under the circumstances. Experience has
demonstrated that accidents are constantly occurring at curves
on the highways, and on straight roads in bad weather, be·
cause drivers persist in turning onto the improper side of the
highway when their vision is obscured, in attempts to pass
other vehicles. But for these acts of cupable negligence, acci·
dents such as the one occurring in the instant case would never
20
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happen. Speed on the part of plaintiffs driver had nothing to
do with the proximate cause of this accident. As a matter of
law, the defendanfs acts of negligence were the sole and
proximate cause of the collision .. In the case of Bragdon vs.
Kellog (Maine), 105 Atlantic 43 3, and annotated in 6 A.L.R.
669, the court in passing upon this question of speed in situations of this nature said:
nit is, then, a matter of common knowledge, the
(usual experience' that automobiles are more often
driven without reference to legal speed than in observance of it. It is the usual experience of operators that
they are not authorized to rely on the legal presumption that an approa~hing car is coming at a legal rate
of speed, but must exercise due care in the operation
of their own car, especially in approaching corners,
curves and turns in the road, where their vision may be
wholly or partially obscured."
And as is said by the author in 5 American Jurisprudence,
paragraph 272, page 654:
"It has been asserted that a driver of a motor truck
on a public highway who voluntarily turns his vehicle
from the right-hand side of the road to the left; where
vehicles going in the opposite direction are expected
to travel, at a time when he cannot see the road for
dust, without giving a reasonable warning signal, is
~rossly negligent.''
and the same author at paragraph 286, page 661, of the same
text book, says:
HThe rights of one on his left-hand side of the road
are inferior to the rights of another coming from the
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opposite direction. A driver on his right~hand side of
the road has a right to assume that another driver
coming from the opposite directon will obey the law
of the road, at least until such time as he sees or should
see that he has no intention of so doing.''
Berry on Automobiles (5th Ed.), paragraph 252.
Purdie vs. Brunswick et al (Wash.) 146 P. 2d 809.
Carma C. O'Mally vs. Dan Eagan et. al (Wyo.) 2 P.
2d 1063, 77 A.L.R. 582.
In the recent decision of Ankeny vs. Talbot et al ( Colo-1952)
250 P. 2d 1019, the plaintiff therein had some 450 feet to
avoid the oncoming defendant who was angling over onto
plaintiff's side of the ·highway. The Supreme Court of Colorado in that case held that the trial court erred in denying
plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict in his favor and against
the defendant Talbot upon the issue of liability and that as
between plaintiff and defendant, the only issue to be determined
by the jury was the amount of damages to be awarded plaintiff.
Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, it
is difficult to perceive how the trial court concluded that the
plaintiff corporation was not entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. What could plaintiff's driver had done other than what
he did do ? He was on his own proper side of the highway and
the sole and proximate cause of the accident was defendant's
culpable negligence in turning directly into his path. The trial
court apparently concluded that plaintiff's speed was a con·
tributing factor. We respectfully submit that the trial court
erred in this respect and that as a matter of law, it cannot be
said that plaintiff's driver was negligent under the particular
22
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circumstances of this case. Before the defense of contributory
negligence will prove availing, it must be shown that the. acts
alleged as constituting such defense direct/ y contributed· to
tbe injury. 5 American Jurisprudence, Para. 407, page 739.

POINT V
THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND THE JUDGMENT OF
NO CAUSE OF ACTION IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Considering what we believe to be the fifth point of error,
we take the position that the trial court's judgment, of no
cause of action, is unsupported by the evidence and contrary
to law. A thorough and careful perusal of the evidence fails
to justify a conclusion that the corporation's driver was guilty
of conduct which in any way contributed to the accident. He
acted as any other reasonably prudent person would have done
under the circumstances. The sole proximate cause of this collision and the resulting damages to plaintiff corporation's motor
vehicle was the negligence of the defendant in failing to keep
or maintain a proper lookout, and in driving to the left. and
improper side of the highway when such movement could
not be made in safety.

CONCLUSION
We respec.tfully submit that each of the points of error
is well taken and· should be sustained, and that the judgment
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of the trial court should be reversed with direction to enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiff corporation for the amount
of damages as prayed in its complaint, and for costs.
Respectfully submitted,
F. ROBERT BAYLE

Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
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